Transformations by Klaman, Laura
Tulsa Law Review 
Volume 37 




Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Laura Klaman, Transformations, 37 Tulsa L. Rev. 849 (2013). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol37/iss4/1 
This Legal Scholarship Symposia Articles is brought to you for free and open access by TU Law Digital Commons. 
It has been accepted for inclusion in Tulsa Law Review by an authorized editor of TU Law Digital Commons. For 
more information, please contact megan-donald@utulsa.edu. 
TRANSFORMATIONS
Laura Kalman*
Whenever I am in the UCLA Law Library, I make a pilgrimage to the desk
where it happened. As if it were yesterday, I am transported back to the fall of
1976. I am a third-year law student taking my first legal history course, and I am
reading the two articles that became Chapters I and VIII of Transformation,1 "The
Emergence of an Instrumental Conception of Law" and "The Rise of Legal
Formalism," for the first time.2 My blood ran cold. Horwitz did not expressly say
that "until we are able to transcend the American fixation with... separating law
from politics," each generation was doomed "frantically to hide behind
unhistorical and abstract universalisms in order to deny.., its own political and
moral choices" until Transformation 11.3 Nevertheless, that was clearly the subtext
of the articles. As one who had studied history in college and who had spent the
previous two years wondering why my law professors were so insistent on
separating law from politics, context, morality, and plain old idiosyncrasy, I found
his message extraordinarily refreshing. Then and there, I decided to become a
legal historian.
So naive was I that I assumed the Harvard History Department and the
Harvard Law School must be intertwined, and that if one wanted to study with the
Charles Warren Professor of American Legal History, the Harvard History
Department was the logical place. (As Sally Gordon reminds me, delusion
typically lies at the heart of conversion narratives.) I actually ran out of the library
to telephone for an application to Harvard's Ph.D. program in History. Harvard
was the only department to which I applied that year, submitting an essay about
how Morton Horwitz had changed my career plans. I was rejected. Certain there
had been some mistake, I applied to Harvard again the following year.
Fortunately, this time, I applied to some other schools as well, for once again, a
* Professor of History, University of California, Santa Barbara. I thank Dan Ernst, W. Randy
Garr, Sally Gordon, Chad Kutmas, Pnina Lahav, and John Henry Schlegel for their help with this
essay.
1. Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law 17801860 (Harv. U. Press 1977).
2. Morton J. Horwitz, The Emergence of an Instrumental Conception of American Law, 1780-1820,
5 Perspectives Am. History 287 (1971); Morton J. Horwitz, The Rise of Legal Formalism, 19 Am. J.
Leg. History 251 (1975).
3. Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 1970-1960: The Crisis of Legal
Orthodoxy 272 (Oxford U. Press 1992). I believe that the fixation is actually held by most American
lawyers, judges, and law professors, as opposed to most Americans. Laura Kalman, The Strange Career
of Legal Liberalism 84 (Yale U. Press 1996).
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slim envelope came from Cambridge.4 Bowing to the inevitable, I went to Yale,
where I met Bill Nelson, John Blum, and my husband. So Morty Horwitz
transformed not only my career, but also my entire life.
The distance between Harvard's History Department and its law school in
the 1970s mirrored that between the disciplines of history and law. The singular
achievement of Transformation was to bridge the two. As someone starting out in
academic life, I innocently assumed that such an achievement would win the book
not just canonical status, but garlands as well. So as a graduate student, I was
stunned by the intensity of the reaction against the book. I have read many a
nasty review since then, but when I recently reread the reviews of Transformation,
I still found many singularly snotty.5 How do we explain them?
It is usually said that historians loved Transformation, so much so that they
gave it the Bancroft Prize in 1978.6 That is not quite right. American historians
who did not write legal history did greatly admire the book. And why not? It
made law intelligible for them: As Steve Presser said, Horwitz managed to discuss
the "holder in due course doctrine," without once calling it by name. It was the
one work of legal history American historians felt obligated to open.
But save for raves in the American Historical Review and the Journal of
American History by Kent Newmyer and Kitty Preyer,8 and a few less prominently
placed plaudits,9 American legal historians in history departments and law schools,
while grudgingly acknowledging the book's brilliance, often nevertheless joined
law professors in the chorus against Transformation. Recall that John Reid
contented "legal historians and lawyers must be alarmed" and concluded that
"[t]he iconoclasts have invaded the temples of legal history. They have smashed
the fetishes, blotted out the frescoes, and desecrated the tombs. If we do not force
them to the evidence, they will even desacralize Clio."'10
Here was one refrain that sounded constantly: "show me the money." Even
though Transformation had 79 pages of endnotes, critics regularly demanded more
proof of its thesis. Their call ensured that over 25,000 copies of Transformation
would be sold and that the book would set the agenda for the next generation.
Consider the spate of articles that followed the book testing "the Horwitz thesis"
11 12 . 13
on contracts," torts, attractive nuisance, etc. 4 What Dan Ernst said in 1993
4. Years later, I was offered a job in the Harvard History Department, and when I telephoned my
parents to tell them, my father said gleefully, "I saved your rejection letters!"
5. For an excellent overview of the reviews, see Wythe Holt, Morton Horwitz and the
Transformation of American Legal History, 23 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 663 (1982).
6. Mark Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies: An Introduction to Its Origin and Underpinnings, 36 J.
Leg. Educ. 505,506 (1983).
7. Stephen Presser, Revising the Conservative Tradition: Towards A New American Legal History,
52 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 700,700 n. 2 (1977).
8. Kathryn Preyer, Book Review, 64 J. Am. History 1099 (1978); Kent Newmyer, Book Review, 82
Am. Historical Rev. 1067 (1977).
9. See e.g. Max Bloomfield, Book Review, 30 Vand. L. Rev. 1102 (1977).
10. John Reid, A Plot Too Doctrinaire, 55 Tex. L. Rev. 1307,1321 (1977).
11. A. W. B. Simpson, The Horwitz Thesis and the History of Contracts, 46 U. Chi. L. Rev. 533
(1980).
12. Gary Schwartz, Tort Law and the Economy in Nineteenth-Century America: A Reinterpretation,
[Vol. 37:849
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remains no less true today: "[fjifteen years after Transformation was published,
some legal scholars and historians still compulsively frame[d] their research to
refute Horwitz'[s] claims.' 15 In this sense, Transformation was very much like my
other favorite work of American history, Richard Hofstadter's Age of Reform. It
fired imaginations.
, To my mind, that qualifies a book for greatness. Indeed, one of the many
virtues of Transformation is that it- makes us think about the definition of a
disciplinary classic. To me, such a book is controversial and provocative in the
best sense of those words. Like the Hofstadter thesis, the book may be proven
wrong, but it is proven wrong because it has often spurred readers to collect new
evidence and always to interpret the evidence in new ways. A classic moves a
discipline forward by inspiring-sometimes even angering-readers sufficiently to
make them want to contribute to it.
Perhaps this definition of a classic is quirky. I once told a colleague of
Horwitz's, who was not a legal historian that it did not matter if every word of
Transformation were proven wrong. The book would still be the greatest work of
legal history to be published in his and my lifetimes. He reacted much as H. R.
Haldeman did when I told him that my favorite President was Lyndon Johnson:
"You can't be serious!"
Some legal historians responded the same way to claims of classic status for
Transformation. In part, that was understandable. Like a bad houseguest, the
book had something to offend everyone. Some were irritated by Horwitz's point
that historians had "overstudied" constitutional law. 6 They seemed to believe
that he claimed he was the first to concentrate on private law. And they charged
that he had ignored his forebears in the consensus school, who had also focused on
the interplay between pressure groups and economic development in the
formation of private law.17 I disagree with those critics. As Wythe Holt suggested,
Horwitz's failure to cite Willard Hurst and others was "a way of underscoring that
he ha[d] radically gone beyond and broken" with the work of consensus
historians.18
For as Eben Moglen observed, in much the same way that the New Left had
torn up "consensus" political history in: the 1960s,19 Horwitz challenged the
"consensus" legal history popularized by the other "H's:" the Handlins, Hartz, and
90 Yale L.J. 1717 (1981).
13. Peter Karsten, Heart versus Head. Judge-Made Law in Nineteenth-Century America (U. N.C.
Press 1997).
14. See e.g. Randall Bridwell, Theme v. Reality in American Legal History: A Commentary on
Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 1780-1860, and on the Common Law in America, 52
Ind. LJ. 449 (1978).
15. Daniel Ernst, The Critical Tradition in the Writing of American Legal History, 102 Yale L.J.
1019,1022 (1993).
16. Horwitz, supra n. 1, at xii.
17. Harry Scheiber, Back to "The Legal Mind?" Doctrinal Analysis and the History of the Law, 5
Revs. in Am. History 458,459 (1977).
18. See Holt, supra n. 5, at 683.
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Hurst.20 These liberals had provided a pedigree for the New Deal when they
pointed to the tradition of legal activity to promote economic growth for the
benefit of all. Hurst praised Transformation as "a first-rate monograph," while
gently pointing out that like conflict, consensus also played a part in American
legal history.21 But other consensus historians stood aghast at Horwitz's allegation
that activity represented a "Machiavellian" conspiracy between merchant and
entrepreneurial groups and the legal profession "to serve the interests of the
wealthy and powerful" by actively promoting "a legal redistribution of wealth
against the weakest groups in society."22
Consensus historians saw a more "benign" explanation for what had
happened than Horwitz. They thought the changes he documented did not reflect
a conspiracy, but "the legal order's responsiveness to changed social conditions
and its ability to evolve in the direction of greater flexibility, greater maturity,
and.., common sense." 23 And besides questioning whether Horwitz had correctly
identified an intent to redistribute, they wondered whether he had gotten the
redistributive effects right and correctly identified the winners and losers.24
Historians on the left piled on, with Mark Tushnet also impugning Horwitz's
inferences about redistributive effects. Additionally, Tushnet wondered whether
Horwitz had paid sufficient attention to the relative autonomy of law.2 Eugene
Genovese found Horwitz guilty of a "tendency towards mechanistic materialism"
that had led Horwitz into "the reductionist trap that caught Charles Beard."
26
Though John Reid had little in common with the Genovese of the 1970s, that
was a critique that resonated for Reid and others who had rebelled against the
consensus school by emphasizing the importance of constitutional principles in
shaping American history. "Constitutional historians" believed Horwitz was
guilty of letting economics explain everything, and according to Reid, leaving "no
place for ideology."2 7 In this, I think they were mistaken. As Max Bloomfield and
Harry Scheiber noted at the time,2s and Bob Gordon and Ted White would
observe later,29 Transformation was much more of a work of intellectual history
than most recognized. Despite Horwitz's protestations to the contrary, I think
Transformation 11 is not "a very different book" from Transformation.
20. Horwitz, supra n. 1, at xiii.
21. Willard Hurst, Book Review, 21 Am. J. Leg. History 175,175,179 (1977).
22. Horwitz, supra n. 1, at 34,259, and 254.
23. Charles McClain, Legal Change and Class Interests: A Review Essay on Morton Horwitz's
Transformation of American Law, 68 Cal. L. Rev. 382, 396-97 (1980). "I really believe that the judges
whose opinions Horwitz analyzes believed they were acting for the benefit of the whole society,"
Charles Blackmar maintained in his Book Review, 22 St. Louis U. L.J. 228,230 (1978).
24. See e.g. McClain, supra n. 23, at 394-95; Scheiber, supra n. 17, at 463-64; James Kettner, Book
Review, 8 J. Interdisciplinary History 390,391 (1977). Morris Arnold, Book Review, 126 U. Pa. L. Rev.
241,245 (1977).
25. Mark Tushnet, A Marxist Interpretation of American Law, 1 Marxist Perspectives 96 (1978).
26. Eugene Genovese, Book Review, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 726,729-30 (1978).
27. Reid, supra n. 10, at 1315.
28. Bloomfield, supra n. 9, at 1105; Scheiber, supra n. 17, at 465.
29. Robert Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 57, 96 n. 92 (1984); G. Edward White,
Transforming History in the Postmodern Era, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 1315,1320-21 (1993).
[Vol. 37:849
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Critics of Transformation sometimes gave Horwitz credit for killing the
"taught tradition" of Roscoe Pound as dead as a doornail. But to them, that
seemed a minor achievement. In the words of Steve Presser: "[flew, if any legal
historians would seriously advance Pound's perspective today, and 'Pound-
pounding' had been a favorite indoor sport for legal historiographers for almost
forty years."3
In fact, the reaction to Transformation demonstrated that Pound's common
law judges who made their decisions on the basis of tradition and reason without
concern for economics or politics remained very much alive among legal historians
and law professors. It is difficult to understand the shrillness of the criticism of
Transformation otherwise. As Bob Gordon said, it was one thing for the realists
to indict late nineteenth century formalist judges with class-biased rulemaking. It
was another to carry "the charges back to the early nineteenth century, the period
that common lawyers had previously celebrated as their heroically 'formative'
era."
31
Thus as Dan Ernst saw, Transformation could be read as Horwitz's cry of
rage not just against Pound, but against Harvard and the legal process tradition it
symbolized.32  Horwitz suggested judges were just as "antimajoritarian" as the
process theorists feared. But where the process theorists counted on craft to
discipline judges, Horwitz alleged craft was a smoke screen for conning the
masses. His was a shout against an institution that would be all the more
vulnerable to Critical Legal Studies because it had proven so impervious to legal
realism. The reaction to Transformation demonstrated that just as Pound's ghost
still hovered, so too did process jurisprudence, even among the heirs to the realist
tradition who comprised the consensus school of legal historians.
Horwitz's rage was important. As Eric Foner said, he wrote "with
passion."33 By making his own politics clear, he reminded us that scholarship is a
political act and that objectivity is impossible. "One strength of the book [was] its
implicit point... that behind the bland and seemingly neutral phrases" historians
had traditionally used-phrases such as "the release of energy"-lay
"fundamental changes in political values and human relations."34  Horwitz
reminded us that like law, scholarship is not neutral.35 That was a reminder that
30. Presser, supra n. 7, at 712.
31. Gordon, supra n. 29, at 96. The indictment of late nineteenth-century judges could more safely
be made in the 1970s than it could be today, though some were beginning to challenge the realists'
depiction of late nineteenth-century judges as the personification of greed and evil. See e.g. Charles
McCurdy, Justice Field and the Jurisprudence of Government-Business Relations: Some Parameters of
Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism, 1863-1897,611. Am. History 970 (1975).
32. Ernst, supra n. 15, at 1024-27.
33. Eric Foner, GetA Lawyer!, N.Y. Rev. of Books 37,39 (Apr. 14,1977).
34. Id.
35. As a twentieth-century American historian, who writes about the period since Watergate, I was
disappointed when Horwitz chose 1960 as the endpoint of Transformation II, contending, "for the
historian, a degree of perspective and distance remains essential if history is not to become simply an
extension of current controversies about law." Horwitz, supra n. 3, at 269. In my view, history is
always an extension of current controversies. That is why each generation must write their own
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those who clung to their faith in "objective" history did not welcome, particularly
since the idea of objectivity in history was already under attack.
The book's message was as important as its tone. Horwitz did not simply say
that law was not neutral and that the powerful realized that "[c]hange brought
through technical legal doctrine" could "more easily disguise underlying political
choices" than change brought through legislation.36 The same year that
Transformation was published he also questioned what he described as the
"excessively reverential and apologetic attitude" of American legal historians and
law professors towards the rule of law.37  They were guilty, he said, of
"pervert[ing] the real function of history by reducing it to the pathetic role of
justifying the world as it is."38 They did not realize that, as Herbert Gutman and
Richard Rorty have said, historical inquiry "transforms historical givens into
historical contingencies 39 and liberates us to make our "own contingencies."
4
Horwitz challenged the belief that legal historians should serve as handmaidens to
the profession and the assumption that the rule of law had been "an unqualified
human good.' 1 The rule of law, he acknowledged, did create "formal equality-a
not inconsiderable virtue., 42 But the rule of law also "promote[d] substantive
inequality by creating a consciousness that radically separate[d] law from politics,
means from ends, [procedural from substantive justice] .... The rule of law
enabled the rich and "the shrewd" to manipulate its forms to their own
advantage." 44
That rankled. Of course, as Bob Gordon once remarked in exasperation,
"For God's sake, at any bar dinner," one could hear the most conservative lawyers
bemoaning the same thing.45 And certainly, Horwitz's despair did not make him
immune to the charms of procedural justice, as his later work on the Warren
46Court would demonstrate. Nevertheless, this articulation of the Critical Legal
Studies critique of rights annoyed those Polyannas who believed one could not
recognize how bad things were and work to improve them. They saw Horwitz's
demolition of process jurisprudence and the rule of law, I believe, as an attack on
their own legal liberalism, and their faith that federal courts could achieve positive
social change. Peter Teachout was one who read Transformation in light of
Horwitz's critique of the rule of law. And to Teachout, Horwitz's work stood out
of truly objective scholarship that seem inconsistent" with everything Horwitz stood for as an historian
and critical legal scholar. Michal Belknap, Book Review, 98 Am. Historical Rev. 970, 971 (1993).
36. Horwitz, supra n. 1, at 100-01.
37. Morton J. Horwitz, Book Review, 86 Yale LJ. 561,565 (1977).
38. Morton J. Horwitz, The Conservative Tradition in the Writing of American Legal History, 17
Am. J. Legal History 275,281 (1973).
39. Herbert Gutman, in Visions of History 187, 203 (Henry Abelove & E. P. Thomson eds.,
Pantheon 1983).
40. Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity 97 (Cambridge U. Press 1989).




45. Gordon, supra n. 29, at 96 n. 96.
46. See Morton J. Horwitz, The Warren Court and the Pursuit of Justice (Hill & Wang 1999).
[Vol. 37:849
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for "its radical antilegalism: its central preoccupation with law as a force for the
destruction of those human values we hold most sacred in a civilization-of
individual dignity, equality, and community."47
Here we come to the heart of it. Transformation came out at a time when all
of its readers had recently seen the power of law to do evil. It also appeared at a
time when its liberal audience was losing hope that the Burger Court would follow
in the Warren Court's footsteps. If Transformation were right, neither Watergate
nor the Burger Court was an aberration. If it were right, perhaps readers who had
gone to law school to learn to do good, even to become legal historians, had
chosen the wrong careers. The reaction to Transformation was so intense among
lawyers and legal historians, I believe, because it reinforced our darkest suspicions
and fears. And the reaction tells us more about ourselves than it does about the
book.
47. Peter Teachout, Light in Ashes: The Problem of "Respect for the Rule of Law" in American
Legal History, 53 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 241, 244 (1978). John Reid also explicitly acknowledged reading
Transformation in conjunction with Horwitz's critique of the rule of law, see Reid, supra n. 10, at 1312
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